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Abstract  
The banking landscape in Europe and Germany has a polypolistic market structure with an average 
vertical range of integration of 80%, implying high process redundancies. Accumulating processes for 
standardized products is one way to achieve efficiency improvements. “Smart sourcing” can change 
the production mix of banks lead to a concentration of processes. A challenge is the lack of consistent 
frameworks for the banking industry to systematically support the sourcing decision process.  
In this paper, drawing on the resource based view and transaction cost economics it is shown that, in 
addition to a make or buy decision, co-operation between competitors should be included into a 
sourcing analysis as the third alternative. To support the decision on making, buying or sharing an 
activity, a quantitative analysis of each activity of the banking value chain is necessary. We propose 
an analysis framework based on a generic banking value chain. Since the recent literature mostly 
focuses only on the outsourcers’ case, a formalized model is developed to consider both the objective 
function of the out- and the insourcer. Since the market might restrict sourcing options, as there may 
be no providers of relevant activities, it can be shown that “sharing” as part of a co-opetition concept 
instead of buy or make can be a way to break up the value chain. The framework thus supports 









The banking industry in Germany and Europe has a polypolistic market structure consisting of some 
15.000 institutions in Europe (Hamoir et al. 2002, p. 118) or 2.355 banks in Germany (Deutsche 
Bundesbank 2003, IV, 24). 96.7 % of all banks listed by Deutsche Bundesbank are universal banks 
offering a full spectrum of banking services. The vertical integration in the German banking industry 
is about 80% compared to a vertical integration of about 20% in the electronic consumer goods market 
(Buchard 1997). One reason are different ways of value generation. Banks mainly exchange 
information and therefore information and communication networks form the essential infrastructure. 
This could result into a paradigmatic shift leading away from traditional proprietary systems 
dominating the universal banking world to specialized banks operating in value networks. This 
substantial change process has recently again been discussed in the context of sourcing decisions, i.e. 
the decision which parts of the banking services are considered to be core business and which are 
expected to be delivered more efficiently by an external provider or a specialized bank. The main 
research questions in this paper are: What is the optimal degree of vertical integration, how can a bank 
improve its production mix by switching from make to buy or by sharing activities between two or 
more banks.  
Chapter 2 introduces Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and the Resource Based View (RBV) to 
offer some valuable theoretical foundation to qualitatively analyze activities with regard to a make, 
buy or share decision. Chapter 3 shows how the criteria derived in chapter 2 can be used to cluster 
activities into make, buy or share, and points at the need to quantitatively support a sourcing decision 
as well. Chapter 4 introduces a generic banking value chain which is used to identify the value 
activities that are analyzed in the analytical framework. Finally in chapter 5, a formal sourcing model 
is developed to show trade-offs between make, buy or share incorporating both the outsourcer’s as 
well as the insourcer’s value function. This optimization model will be the focal point for further 
research.  
Within this paper different sourcing terms are used, for which we propose the following definitions. 
Sourcing analysis is defined as the analysis of the combination of internal and external resources and 
capabilities to improve the production mix of a company or a bank. The overall goal of a sourcing 
analysis is to realize efficiency improvements as cost minimizing or value maximizing (Blomquist et 
al. 2002, 4). Outsourcing is the abbreviation for “outside resource using”. These words refer to the 
usage of superior resources outside the company, i.e. the evaluation of potential suppliers (Arnold, 
2000, 24). A company that gives an activity to an external partner, which was formerly produced by 
the company itself, is called outsourcer. The insourcer is the external partner that takes over the 
activity from the outsourcer. 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
2.1 Transaction Cost Economics 
TCE is mainly based on the work of Commons (1934), Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975, 1981, 
1985). TCE are key to the analysis of the efficiencies of different governance structures, i.e. market, 
hierarchy and other managerial governance patterns called hybrids such as joint ventures, strategic 
alliances and franchises etc. (Williamson 1991). It is used to examine organizations with regard to the 
efficient boundary of an organization, i.e. which activities should be produced in-house and which 
should be sourced externally (Williamson, 1985).  
Companies are hierarchically designed as the governance is based on the property rights of the 
management and complementary attributes given by processes and administrative control mechanisms 
(Arnold, 2000, 24). The market is steered by price mechanisms (Williamson, 1985) and hierarchical 
control is replaced by contractual agreements. Hybrid forms, e.g. joint ventures or shared services 
organizations, include governance elements from markets and hierarchies (Tröndle, 1987).  
Transactions are defined as the transfer of goods or services between technologically separable 
interfaces, i.e. one activity finishes and a new one begins (Williamson, 1985, 552). The more frictions 
occur during the transfer of goods and services, the higher are the transaction costs. Williamson (1975, 
1983) identified three variables explaining the differences of transactions: frequency, uncertainty and 
asset specificity.  
Frequency targets the re-occurrence of transactions within an organization or company. Transactions 
that are processed frequently are expected to be more likely produced in-house (Poppo and Zenger, 
1998). The second variable - uncertainty – states that increasing uncertainty implies higher ransaction 
costs and can be expected if transactions are long-lasting or if information asymmetries exist. Asset 
specificity is “the most important dimension for describing transactions” (Williamson 1981, p555). An 
insourcer has to make production specific investment if he takes over highly specific activities from an 
outsourcer. Furthermore, the insourcer is only able to amortize its specific investment if the 
relationship with the outsourcer is long-lasting. Therefore, the investment of the insourcer needs 
contractual safeguards that avoid a termination of the contract or post contractual bargaining (Klein et 
al., 1978). This leads to complex contracts and high negotiating, monitoring and enforcing costs. Thus, 
high asset specificity implies in-house production and “has a strong negative effect on market 
performance” (Poppo and Zenger, 1998, 867).   
As shown, frequency, uncertainty and asset specificity are indicators for making or buying an activity. 
If frequency, uncertainty and asset specificity are high the TCE indicates high transaction costs for 
externally sourced activities and comparatively lower transaction costs for internal production. But 
besides transaction costs, production costs have to be included in the analysis as well (Cheon et al., 
1995, 213; Poppo and Zenger, 1998). Managers have to analyze an activity and to make a trade-off 
analysis between transaction costs and production efficiency of this activity to decide on the 
production by an external supplier (market mechanism), in-house production (hierarchy) or joint 
production within a hybrid institutional design (Apte, 1990; Lacity and Hirschheim, 1993; Cheon, 
1995). Thus, companies will only buy products or services if production cost advantages offset the 
transaction costs. The trade-off between transaction and production costs is an approach to explain the 
different levels of vertical integration and builds a possible framework for companies to decide on a 
discrete level between different governance structures and sourcing strategies. Thus TCE analyzes the 
efficiency of different governance structures and thereby shed light on the “outside usage” of 
resources. They do not analyze the differences in resources and capabilities between different sourcing 
alternatives. The resource based-view of the firm is a suitable approach to analyze resources and to 
identify if superior resources should be acquired externally.    
2.2 Theory of the Firm – Resource based view 
Based on Penrose (1959), who pointed out the importance of heterogeneous firm resources, the RBV 
of the firm advanced (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991). RBV represents a framework for 
understanding how companies can gain and sustain competitive advantages if they have superior 
resources and capabilities compared to their competitors. Resources and capabilities are defined as 
(tangible and intangible) assets, which especially include organizational processes and routines, 
management skills and company specific information and knowledge (Barney et al., 2001, 625). 
Barney (1991) built a framework to evaluate whether the resource of a firm is a source of sustainable 
competitive advantage or not. Superior resources are described by Barney (1991) to be valuable, rare, 
imperfectly imitable and non-substitutable. Resources are valuable if they lead to an increase in 
revenues or a decrease in costs. They are rare if they are not employed by other firms or only by a few 
firms. Resources are imperfectly imitable if they are path-dependent, if it is not clear for a competitor 
how to develop an identical resource within a short-or medium time period (causal ambiguity) or if 
there is social complexity, e.g. a network of experts or individuals that cannot be bought. Furthermore 
it is required that the resource is not substitutable, i.e. there are no alternative resources available to 
other firms that provide the same value as the deployed resource. Regarding sourcing strategies, a 
resource-based view on a distinct activity can be used to analyze whether resources are able to provide 
a competitive advantage within an activity or not. This analysis may be a step toward a decision on 
making or buying this activity, while a buying-decision includes the external acquisition of desired 
resources and capabilities that are not internally available to the firm (Stevensen, 1976).  
3 A QUALITATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR SOURCING DECISIONS 
TCE and RBV support a general model for sourcing decisions (Quinn and Hilmer, 1994; Arnold, 
2000). A company can arrive at three results applying a sourcing analysis: the traditional “make or 
buy” decision (Coase, 1937; Arrow; 1962) or a decision on sharing activities between competitors to 
realize production economies. The corresponding institutional designs to these three alternatives are, 
in accordance with TCE, hierarchy (=make), market (=buy) and hybrids (=share/co-opetition).  
3.1 The Make-Decision  
Based on the RBV, a bank will make an activity if it represents a sustainable source of competitive 
advantage, i.e. the underlying resources and capabilities are valuable, rare, non-imitable and non-
substitutable (Barney, 1991). In accordance with TCE, activities with high asset specificity, that are 
produced frequently and where uncertainty is high will be made in-house, as these factors lead to 
increased governance costs (Arnold, 2000, 25; Poppo and Zenger, 1998). Using both theories, it is 
possible to identify activities that are kept in-house.  
From a resource-based-view, hybrid forms like a joint ventures would lead to a loss of the sustainable 
competitive advantage, as the superior resources and capabilities could be imitated by partner 
companies. This phenomenon can be seen e.g. in software development, where software is cloned after 
an alliance failed or when pharmaceutical giants build joint ventures with biotech companies to 
indirectly acquire the resource-bundle or know-how available in the biotech company.  
3.2 Sharing 
Sharing describes a way of co-opetition where hybrid institutional designs are used to gain efficiencies 
by bundling activities between competitors to realize scale and skill economies. “Sharing” is 
preferable, if there is no real differentiation to the competitors, i.e. no lasting competitive advantage 
and also no measurable competitive disadvantage. In this case a major source of differentiation is size, 
i.e. realizing scale economies. If a company or bank is able to get load on an activity using hybrid 
institutional design, it is possible to reduce costs per unit and to build up a sustainable competitive 
advantage with regards to scale economies. The scale of the operations will be a barrier of entry for 
potential competitors.   
3.3 The Buy-Decision 
The third alternative is buying and will be taken if the activity does not provide any competitive 
advantage and is not considered a core competence (Quinn and HiImer, 1994, 43). Additionally asset 
specificity, uncertainty and frequency should be low to decrease governance and migration costs for 
buying the activity from a specialized bank or external supplier (Globerman, 1980; Globerman and 
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Figure 1 .   Model for sourcing decisions (partly based on Arnold, 2000, 26) 
Schwindt, 1986; Liebermann, 1991; Hallwood, 1990; Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995; Ang, 1998; 
Poppo and Zenger, 1998). The objective of an outsourcing deal is to participate on efficiency 
advantages of the insourcer. The insourcer, as a specialist for the activity, is able to achieve scale 
economies and produces goods and services to a lower cost while improving quality through the 
application of specialist knowledge (Ricardo, 1970; Stigler, 1951; Quinn and Hilmer, 1994; Alexander 
and Young, 1996). In the banking industry, e.g. IT Infrastructure was sourced out from Banks like 
ABN Amro, Citibank or Deutsche Bank to different system operators like IBM, EDS or CSC. The 
value added from outsourcing IT Operations are increased efficiency (e.g. scale economies), 
effectiveness (e.g. higher network availability) and flexibility (e.g. variabilized costs) (Lancelotti et al. 
2003, 132).  
Prerequisite for outsourcing is that the there is a reliable and efficient market which is determined by 
different suppliers with adequate but not dominating scale and mature market standards and terms 
(Quinn and Hilmer, 1994). Furthermore the outsourcing deal will only be done if the cost reduction of 
an outsourcing deal offsets the transaction costs (Vining and Globerman, 1999, 646).  
This analysis provides a framework using TCE and RBV to cluster activities into “make”, “share” or 
“buy” alternatives. The presented framework can be seen as an analysis to qualitatively prepare a 
sourcing decision. But the final decision on outsourcing, in-house or jointly producing an activity is 
finally an investment decision and has to be evaluated quantitatively (Tayles and Dury 2001, 607). A 
quantitative analysis requires the identification of value activities operated by a bank. Only if there are 
distinct value activities, it is possible to analyze these activities. The value chain as a tool enables to 
cluster activities and to break down activities into processes which is required to quantitatively analyze 
costs and revenues, i.e. the value generated in each process step.    
4 SOURCING SUBJECT: THE GENERIC BANKING VALUE CHAIN  
The value chain is used to identify activities that are core capabilities and sources of competitive 
advantage as well as activities that are non-core activities (Lamarque, 1999, 141). Lancelotti et al. 
(2003) point out that it is crucial for sourcing decisions to understand the value creation mechanisms 
to define sourcing objectives and establish transparency on services and cost efficiency. The process 
view of the value chain enables on the one side the allocation of resources. On the other side the chain 
view mitigates to identify how different activities interact with each other, i.e. what outcomes one 
activity delivers to another activity and what transaction costs would result from insourcing, 
outsourcing etc. This process view also seems to support that the value chain is better capable to 
analyze activities with regard to sourcing decisions than a listing of value activities or an SBU 
(Strategic Business Unit) analysis.   
Originally Porter (1985) developed a value chain to define the different areas of value creation in the 
producer goods industry. The value activities defined by Porter for the producer goods industry are not 
fully transferable to the banking industry as the industrial value generation differs from the production 
process of a bank (Canals, 1993, 197-206; Lamarque; 1999). The banking business is customer driven 
and therefore the banking value chain starts from the market side. The value process starts with 
advertising a newly developed product or service to the market. Secondly, the product/service is sold 
to customers, e.g. the credit contract will be signed by the customer. In a third step the product will be 
provided to the customer, e.g. the credit amount is paid to the account of the customer. Finally the 
corresponding transactions, like payments, clearing & settlement transactions etc. will be processed.  
Hamoir et al. (2002) and Steffens (2002) reflect this process by differentiating the primary activities 
into distribution, products and transactions/infrastructure. The distribution part of the banking value 
chain consists of marketing and sales activities. Marketing includes promotion and advertising 
activities, branding the firm name/products/services and sales support. Sales consists of multichannel 














































Figure 2.  Generic Banking Value Chain 
The value activities from products include the product development process as well as the provision of 
the product itself, e.g. the payment of the credit amount to the client. All products of a bank can be 
subsumed under the terms funding, investment and services. The financial intermediation business is 
reflected in the “funding” and “investment” parts of the product activities. The transactions part of the 
value chain is processing products and services offered by the banking industry. The transaction 
activities include  
• payment transactions for national and international payments,  
• clearing and settlement transaction for securities, derivatives and credits,  
• trading transactions for the exchange and price determination of securities and derivatives and  
• custody transactions including infrastructure, e.g. custody of securities and deposit box facilities.  
These primary activities are enabled by the supporting activities infrastructure, technology and human 
resources (Canals, 1993, 199; Porter, 1985). Additionally to these three supporting activities, risk 
management plays a vital role in banking and has to be added (Lamarque, 1999).  
The presented generic banking value chain allows to breakdown a value activity into process steps and 
gives an indication for the interaction with other processes. In figure 3 we show how a break down 
could look like for a consumer credit.    
A case study to the generic value chain for consumer credits 
The generic value chain for consumer credits can be used to identify resource usage and to quantify 
cost efficiency and value added for each process. This builds the foundation to compare in-house 
efficiency with the efficiency of a potential supplier and to identify potential cost savings that would 
result from “sharing” production facilities with other banks/non-banks.  
 
Figure 3.  A generic value chain for consumer credits 
Additionally, it opens the possibility to compare the in-house efficiency with market benchmarks. 
Sources of competitive advantage can also be identified from a qualitative view and computed 
performance figures can support these qualitative aspects. Taking e.g. the Norisbank, which 
introduced “easycredit” in the German Banking market, the following sources of competitive 
advantage can be identified:  
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Marketing: Norisbank successfully branded the product “easycredit®” independently from the 
corporate identity of the Norisbank. The registered trademark is valuable and rare, as it represents an 
established and registered brand mark.   
Sales: The Norisbank is able to deploy different sales channels, including its own branches, partner 
banks, online channels and non-financial enterprises to sell easycredit to potential customers. Utilizing 
effectively multichannel management enables the Norisbank to leverage the sales of easycredit. 
Consequently Norisbank is able to invest 87´% of all funds in its core product consumer credits 
(Norisbank, 2003). 
Products/Transactions: Norisbank is processing its consumer credits fully automated. This leads to a 
significant reduction in processing time during the offering and settlement phase. E.g. the average 
processing-time per signed “easycredit” contract is 35 minutes compared to 128 minutes in average for 
other banks (Norisbank, 2002, 13). 
From the resource based view, Norisbank regards consumer credits as their core business. Which can 
be supported by the transaction cost view: Norisbank made specific investments to optimize their 
processes and to establish a brand in the market. Furthermore the frequency of the consumer credit 
activity is high (69% of total assets) and leads to scale and skill economies. On the other site, banks do 
especially not always consider parts of the transaction business as core business. Therefore Deutsche 
Bank sourced out their custody services to State Street Corp. and Sal. Oppenheim is buying clearing 
and settlement services for securities form the European Transaction Bank. Taking these examples, a 
bank can analyze each activity of the individual value chain, benchmark it against the competitors and 
decide on making, buying or sharing a service.  
5 AN OPTIMZATION MODEL FOR THE SOURCING DECISION 
In this chapter we want to lay ground for an optimization model using the previously introduced 
generic value chain for banking as building block to analyze the possible variables influencing the 
sourcing decision in a quantitative way taking both a possible target function of the out- as well as the 
insourcer into account.  
Up to this point we focused on the cost side of a sourcing decision modeling the banking value chain 
by de- or increasing vertical integration. An optimum of vertical integration and thus the decision 
process on what parts of the value chain to source – in or out – is a question of how quantification of 
functional dependencies is possible. For this analysis we want to lay ground in this article, modeling 
functional interdependencies influencing the sourcing case and analyzing the variables that determine 
that functionality. First let us analyze the cost determinants that influence the optimization model on 
the out- as well as the insourcers side of operations and processes. Drivers of cost efficiency are 
economies of skill, economies of scale and economies of scope (Baumol et al. 1982). Economies of 
skill define the position of the cost function. An improvement in skill economies leads to a shift of the 
average unit cost function towards the left side. Economies of skill are realized by technology 
leadership and/or superior resource bundles. Production side economies of scale are mainly realized by 
fix cost digressions and learning curve effects. Economies of scope are realized where it is possible to 





Figure 4a/b.  Increasing Economies of Skill/Scale  
Consequently deciding on a more cost efficient way to producing an activity “j” it is necessary to take 
in consideration the cost function, the output size and possible scope economies. Formalized the cost 
function representing the current skill level would be:  
(1) ),( wyC jj  
with yj being the quantity of activity j and w being the vector of factor prices times factor input.  
Scale Economies are realized if the relative change of the cost is less than the relative change of the 










Scope economies can be measured by the difference between the sum of the individual cost functions 
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N=(1,2,…,n)  = set of activities with scope economies 
y=(y1,…,yn) = output generated by activities 1 to n  
w  = Vector of factor prices times factor input 
Let us take a look at the classical case, a buy vs. make decision without considering transaction costs 



























This term describes, that the bank will decide on make or buy by comparing the own cost efficiency 
including loss of scope economies with the realized scale economies of the potential insourcer for a 
given cost function of the insourcer.  
Secondly let us look at the value side of the optimization model. We mentioned the overall goal of a 
sourcing analysis, which is to realize efficiency improvements as cost minimizing or value 
maximizing (Blomquist et al. 2002, 4). We already argued that a bank will never outsource an activity 
where it generates higher value than its competitors. This is coming back to the point of determining 
the maximum firm’s value for the case of financial services. It is evident that each activity should have 
a clear deliverable to the firms’ value by representing the most efficient process and superior resources 
upscaling the firms’ competitive advantage. In the following we define and use variables (Ngwenyama 
et al. 1999, 356) and put them into a basic functional context, in a way to consider both the value and 
the cost approach described for the outsourcer as well as the insourcer: 
=A set of different governance structures 
=)(aG  coordination and monitoring cost function to the outsourcer with Aa∈  
=jy output of activity j 
=),( wyC cost function of the outsourcer 
=),( yaP price the outsourcer pays the insourcer under governance structure a  for a given output y. 
=)(sS outsourcers’ setup costs influenced by the outsourcers’ asset specificity s 
=δ  measure of quality of the sourcers’ performance (dependent on economies of skill) with oi δδ ≥  
=)(δV value function to the outsourcer if the insourcers performance is δ 
=),,,( δawyC  cost function of insourcer to maintain a performance under governance structure a 
=Φ  minimum profit rate of the insourcer 
=),,,(0 pyaE δ value profit function if the insourcers performance is δ 
=),,,( pyaEi δ insourcers profit function when his performance is δ and the price is p 





















s.t. Φ≥−= ),,,(),(),,( iiijjijiii awyCyaPyaE δδ  
When looking at specific banking processes it is relevant in our model not only to qualify but to 
quantify δ, which is the measure of quality of the insourcers performance and his ability to score on 
his economies of skill. The set of skills are defined by the capability to deliver superior resources and 
efficient process design and implementation assuming a given asset specificity and processes of the 
outsourcer.  
Case study of optimizing a shared approach of providing sourcing services 
The strategy to maximize on the banks respectively outsourcers target function would then clearly 
point at a specialized transaction service as the specialized provider is expected to have a superior skill 
set. A high asset specificity of the outsourcer would in turn minimize the outsourcers’ value function 
by increasing setup costs. The probability of the insourcer taking up operations would depend on its Ф, 
the minimum profit rate. The alternative for the outsourcer, to reduce asset specificity would be to 
“squeeze the lemon first”, e.g. to reengineer proprietary transaction systems before sourcing them out. 
That would decrease the outsourcers set up costs and also give the outsourcer a stronger leverage on 
(a), the price the outsourcer pays the insourcer under the governance structure a. The case of two 
banks sourcing their processes for selected activities in one operation deserves special attention. This 
was the planning with two banks in Germany to jointly operate their payment transaction in one 
transaction bank. Here the two joint venture partners try to maximize their target functions separately: 
[ ]SaGyaPVpyaEaGwyCVyaEMAX jijiijjooA −−−=−−= )(),()(),,,(/)(),()(),,( 0 δδδδ
 
[ ]SaGyaPVpyaEaGwyCVyaEMAX jijiijjooB −−−=−−= )(),()(),,,(/)(),()(),,( 0 δδδδ
 
to then jointly maximize the Joint Ventures- Transaction Bank target function: 
Φ≥−= ),,,(),(),,,( δδ awyCyaPpyaE jjjiii  
As this is not a multi-vendor market for the insourcer and neither a price monopoly, where the 
insourcer is the only possible provider, price sensitivity is close to 0 and both outsourcing parties 
would try to minimize P(a,yj) to maximize their own value of outsourcing this transaction activity. 
Because of the defined governance structure Joint Venture G(a) is given. Also as C(yj,w) is substituted 
by P(a, yj). So the only variable differentiating both partners is S. High asset specificity would result in 
high setup costs. This was the case with the two banks. Bank A has highly specific assets which would 
result into the depreciation of all deployed assets for payment transactions. Therefore the Value 
function of the Co-opetition deal for the Bank A decreases and led to a failure of the joint venture.  
In many fields of the banks primary activities no potential insourcers exist or are reasonably 
considered because primary activities are considered “core” to the bank that δ and the needed set of 
skills can hardly be delivered by an external provider. The far more  challenging sourcing decisions lie 
within the “core value chain” consisting of Marketing, Sales, Production and Transaction, where the 
factor δ is determining the value function V(δ) and the quality of processes. Transaction processes 
within financial services are chosen as entry point for our analysis because their processes are closely 
related to the IT infrastructures and thus give a clear indication and measurability within our designed 
framework and optimization model for sourcing decisions. Furthermore there is already a market for 
transaction services which can be examined.  
6 SUMMARY AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
This paper introduces a qualitative framework using RBV and TCE to identify superior skill sets and 
governance structures as well as the value chain to analyze the activities existing in the banking 
industry. So it was shown in a generic way how an analysis can be conducted and what are the value 
activities which have to be analyzed in the banking industry.  
Finally, the basics of a formalized optimization model were introduced to understand the interactions 
between the different variables influencing sourcing decisions. Furthermore it was shown that co-
opetition may break up the value chain in the banking industry, where there are partly no markets to 
source primary activities from. This model is laying ground for further research especially analyzing 
the variables and their sensitivity and testing the model on real sourcing cases. 
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